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Beyond the Hall of Mirrors? Some Theoretical Reflections on the Global 
Contestation of Media Power 
 
Nick Couldry  
    [7031 words, inc notes, excluding reff] 
 
‘there is no alternative communication without a social practice which determines 
and ratifies it.’ (Fernando Reyes Matta, quoted in Lozade and Kincar, 2000: 8) 
 
This chapter asks: can we model theoretically the possibilities for contesting media 
power around the world? This is, already, a controversial starting-point because it 
isolates ‘media power’ as a separate dimension of social conflict, and thus goes 
against the trend of most social and media theory. This move is, however, important if 
the full comparative significance of much alternative media is to be grasped.  
 
What is ‘media power’? Surely, you might ask, media institutions and media 
productions constantly register the influences of many forces outside themselves 
(state and corporate influences to name but two). Can ‘media’ possess a power that is 
contestable separately from the state or corporate sector’s representations of 
themselves through media? Certainly there are overlaps between the contestation of 
media power and other forms of power, but that does not mean that no distinctive 
social issues arise about media power, that is, the overwhelming concentration of 
most, if not all, societies’ symbolic resources in the separate institutional sphere we 
call ‘the media’, only that those issues often seem more remote than others. This is 
one result of the distinctive features of symbolic power in general. 
 
‘Symbolic power’ is perhaps the least understood of the fundamental types of power 
(economic, political, military, symbolic). For, while at its most basic level, ‘symbolic 
power’ is easily understood as ‘the capacity to intervene in the course of events, to 
influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production 
and transmission of symbolic forms’ (Thompson, 1995: 17), we have to grasp 
something wider: the effect of the overwhelming concentration of symbolic power in 
particular places, especially the media. In this concentrated form, symbolic power 
(including media power) is better defined as a ‘power of constructing reality’,1 that is, 
social reality. To contest media power is to contest the way social reality itself is 
defined or named.2 This is no easy thing, since it involves contesting the prevailing 
definitions of what is socially contestable; in particular, it means contesting media 
institutions’ preeminent position as our frame onto the ‘realities’ of the social world.3 
Much more than contesting specific media representations is involved.  
 
Given these complexities, there is value in giving theoretical order to the divergent 
forms media power’s contestation might take – the purpose of this chapter. An image 
may help bring home what is distinctive about this approach. If, for a moment, we 
imagine contemporary power as a large, sprawling palace, economic, military and 
political power would occupy the central rooms with their own dedicated rear exits: 
sites where instructions are given, orders planned, and priorities decided. Today’s 
main forms of symbolic power, including media power, would be located in the 
entrance rooms to the palace, the mirrored halls where actors enter, wait and publicly 
exit. This image – of a palace complex of separate rooms and divided powers – is of 
course an illusion, since the pervasive transnational reach of today’s power-relations 
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and their complex  interconnections make any architectural image of power 
unsustainable. In a notable rethinking of global power, Hardt and Negri (2000: xii) 
write of ‘Empire’ as ‘a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that 
progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding 
frontiers’. All the more striking, then, that even Hardt and Negri, when thinking about 
resistance to Empire, retain a nostalgia for the mirrored space of global media events 
into which local acts of resistance to capitalism are sometimes transformed. ‘Perhaps’, 
they write, ‘the more capital extends its global networks of production and control, 
the more powerful any singular point of revolt can be’ (2000: 58). ‘Any’ singular 
point, whatever its conditions and location? Following the protests against global 
corporate values at Seattle and elsewhere, it is a seductive idea that, as global 
capitalism’s functioning relies increasingly on global media, its vulnerability to local 
contestation increases exponentially. But, whatever temporary subsidy global media 
provide to the spread of resistant images, the result is rarely a redistribution of media 
power. The longer-term importance of Seattle lay not only in the media attention it 
generated, or its challenges to corporate values and global governance, but in a new 
and still continuing challenge to the infrastructure of global media power: the 
Indymedia movement (see Downing in this volume). But this is to turn from the 
comings and goings in global media’s hall of mirrors to the conflicts over symbolic 
resources being waged in countless specific locations. It is on this distinctive thread 
within today’s forms of global social conflict that I want to concentrate.  
 
The concentration of symbolic power in specific institutional spheres is not, in itself, 
new. Medieval and early modern Western Europe was characterised by the intense 
concentration of symbolic power, and symbolic production, in the Catholic church, a 
concentration that the emergence of the printed book helped to undermine (Curran, 
2002: chapter 2). From the late 17th century onwards, the modern state emerged not 
just as a concentration of economic and military power, but increasingly as a rival 
concentration of symbolic and definitional power, controlling by the late 19th century 
the terms on which all corporations and individuals operated and even existed (for a 
developed theory of the French state in particular, see Bourdieu, 1996). The 
contemporary interrelations between the state’s and the media’s symbolic powers 
remain, however, largely uncharted.4 In some late modern states, media power has 
come into conflict not so much with the state’s as with religious institutions’ symbolic 
power, for example in 1970s and 1980s Iran (Mohammadi and Sreberny-Mohammadi, 
1994). Profound concentrations of, and contestations for, symbolic power are not 
therefore new, yet in many accounts by sociologists and political scientists, media 
power (the latest  form of such concentrations) is either absent or collapsed into its 
supposed determinants in economic or state power. It is crucial to keep it distinct, if 
we are to grasp how not only corporate and state actors, but others (individuals and 
communities, NGOs and transnational networks) contest the local and global 
structures of media power. (All this – to emphasise the point once again – without 
ruling out the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that those actions overlap with 
contests over other forms of power and specific media representations.) 
 
The insistence on the analytic separation of media power has implications for wider 
debates about media’s social impacts.  Contrary to one narrow version of the political 
economy thesis, media power is only partly about the ownership structure of media 
corporations and the infrastructure of media distribution. This (very real) political 
economy has a ‘cultural’ dimension: the universe of beliefs, myths and practices that 
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allows a highly unequal media system to seem legitimate (cf Couldry, 2000). This is 
why, in considering possible sites of resistance to media power, we must look not 
only at the distribution of economic and organisational resources, or contests over 
specific media representations of reality, but also at the sites from where alternative 
general frames for understanding social reality are on offer. Beliefs in the media’s 
central place in social life can only be effectively challenged by alternative frames. 
This follows from the special nature of symbolic power as both practical resource (in 
the hands of particular people and institutions) and a long-term influence over 
people’s beliefs about social reality. Put another way, as the quotation from Matta at 
the head of the chapter puts it, any lasting challenge to media power require a 
different social practice. Contesting media power, ultimately (there are, of course, 
many preparatory stages), means developing new forms of communication in the 
broader sense, that is, new ways ‘in which people come to possess things in common’ 
(John Dewey, quoted Carey, 1989: 22).  
 
I will, first, tentatively review the possibilities for, and constraints upon, the 
contestation of media power, in a way, I hope, that stimulates comparative 
perspectives. Second, less abstractly, I will look at two specific visions of how media 
power might shift: one market-based (drawing on an interview with the founder of the 
online news platform Out There News) and the other community-based (drawing on 
documents recently circulated within the global Indymedia network).  
 
Contesting Media Power: where to start? 
 
In a sense, the answer is simple: ‘just do things differently’, echoing the phrase coined 
by the 1960s US activists, the Yippies, and more recently adapted both by Nike’s 
global strategists and alternative videomakers.5 In other words, the answer lies in 
practice. But why and how exactly should everyday practice be reconfigured, if 
sustainable challenges to media power are to emerge? 
 
Contesting media power, in that sporting metaphor beloved of management gurus, 
means thinking ‘outside the box’. The box in question is what the anthropologist 
Maurice Godelier called the little understood ‘black box of those mechanisms which 
govern the distribution of the same representations among social groups with partially 
or profoundly opposed interests’:6 here the black box of ‘the media’. The media are 
part of contemporary society’s ‘habitus’ or (in Pierre Bourdieu’s general sense of that 
term) its ‘history turned into nature’.7 Challenging the social order that passes for 
‘nature’ means, at the very least, thinking differently about our own orientation to 
media. Consider the following from the Australian media and software activist, 
Matthew Arnison (I return to him later): 
 
Old media technology creates a natural hierarchy between the storytellers and the 
audience. The storyteller has access to some piece of technology, such as a TV 
transmitter or a printing press. The audience don’t . . .  
Somewhere along the way, this has been justified by assuming that most people 
aren’t that creative, that having only a handful of people to tell stories in a city of 
millions is a natural way of doing things. But is it? . . . (Arnison, 2002a: 1) 
 
Beneath the fable-like phrase ‘somewhere along the way’ lies a whole (infamous) 
history of how, as part of a wider process of centralisation and government (cf 
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Mattelart, 1994), modern populations became accustomed to the idea that society’s 
principal stories and images should be told from one place, ‘the media’, and that this 
‘place’, while of public importance, was somewhere to whose everyday operations 
access was, for most members of the public, strictly controlled.  
 
This concentration of symbolic resources (or ‘media power’ as I call it for shorthand) 
could not work if its operations were transparent, or if accepting it were a matter of 
explicit belief. Why believe that certain institutions have a special status in narrating 
the social world, privileged above individuals’ accounts of living in that world? 
Media institutions depend on a silent division, reproduced across social space, 
between those who make stories and those who consume them. You can call it a 
‘division of labour’, but that risks naturalising it as an irreducible economic ‘fact’. 
Most of us have our work cut out, literally, to hold down a job (or jobs), look after our 
bodily needs and have some social life; consuming media is a thread (not necessarily 
a major thread) through most lives, but producing media is generally someone’s else’s 
job. Most of us don’t have the time or resources to challenge the division between 
society’s story-tellers and story-consumers.8 Or rather, for the lucky ones among us 
who still have some choice, it does not seem to make sense to spend our limited ‘free’ 
time in contesting the large-scale inequalities underlying how and by whom society’s 
stories are told. Except, perhaps, when we individually feel wronged by one of those 
stories; in earlier research, I foregrounded the accounts of people, not previously 
much exercised by media power, who experienced the everyday asymmetry of media 
operations on the ground (Couldry, 2000, Part 3). But precisely because the media 
process is so selective, such disruptive encounters are not most people’s experience. 
Not only, then, as acknowledged earlier, are contests over the generality of media 
power often difficult to distinguish from other social contests channeled through 
media, but the very idea of contesting media power is difficult to articulate, because 
that power is no profoundly naturalised. So how are we to think about the possibilities 
for contesting media power in the general run of social life? 
 
Symbolic power requires prior organisational and economic resources (to buy 
cameras, own radio frequencies, produce news stories) but, if accumulated on a 
sufficient scale, results over the long-term in something qualitatively different: 
influence over people’s beliefs, in particular those beliefs (barely articulated) through 
which we frame the social world.9 It follows that contesting media power is only 
possible if there exists a well-resourced social site outside media institutions from 
where a rival narrative authority over the social world can plausibly be enunciated. 
Where might such alternative concentrations of symbolic power be? Let’s begin with 
corporations, the state and/or the military, and religious institutions. 
 
Corporations are not a promising source for alternatives to media power, precisely 
because the business of selling is intimately bound up with the maintenance of market 
access, which in turn, in all contemporary societies, depends on the reach of media 
institutions. Occasionally, an embattled corporation’s own myth-making is at odds 
with the media’s working assumptions (for example, when employees of Arthur 
Andersen (US) recently used photo opportunities to project their loyalty to that firm’s 
‘values’, as it faced scandal for its role in the Enron collapse), but such cases will 
always be exceptional.  
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States are, prima facie, more promising, at least as a source of subsidy to those who 
want to build alternatives to media power: first, because states have their own well-
established symbolic resources (to regulate state boundaries and definitions of 
citizenship, to control the terms on which business can and cannot operate, goods and 
images can circulate). Second, specific states may sometimes feel their interests are at 
odds with the agendas of media institutions. The occasions when (with or without the 
military, which we can avoid considering separately, since they generally lack 
symbolic resources of their own) states have contested media power are hardly to be 
celebrated (1970s Chile?). On the other hand, 20th century media history offers other 
examples of how the modern state’s close interest in the rhetorical reach of emerging 
media (such as the BBC in Britain) subsidised institutional alternatives to complete 
media centralisation (for example, BBC regional programming, the 1960s/ 1970s 
‘access’ television movement). Without such state subsidies, there could not have 
emerged the relatively balanced  ‘media ecology’10 in countries such as Britain with 
their public service tradition. However, as the state’s ability to influence global 
market structures declines, it is an increasingly precarious rival to media power, 
especially when state power, like corporate power, is increasingly dependent on 
media access to markets (usually called ‘electorates’).11  
 
What of religious institutions, acting within or outside the ambit of the state? On the 
face of it, this is promising. In most societies religious institutions promulgate their 
own framing narratives of the social world, and indeed the cosmos, that are not 
directly reliant on media reference-points. The role of religious belief, as a site of 
challenges to the media ‘frame’, is one of the most neglected topics in media 
studies,12 although after September 11 2001 its neglect is hard to defend. The 
importance of the Catholic church in the development of alternative, especially 
community-based, media in Latin America is discussed elsewhere in this volume 
(Rodriguez), but note the contribution of Paulo Freire’s (1972) secular concept of 
‘conscientization’ to that history. Religious institutions are, of course, not the only 
source of large-scale framing narratives: until 1989, state socialism, rightly or 
wrongly, was an obvious alternative, and both socialism and anarchism live on in 
different forms (again, see Downing in this volume), sometimes intersecting with 
media practice. In various fragmented ways, utopian and/ or religious visions are 
traceable in the current work of national and global NGOs, although generally NGOs 
do not engage in direct contestations of media power, since they, like corporate and 
state forces, depend on the existing reach of media institutions.  Perhaps the most 
powerful alternative frame in current global politics is the World Social Forum’s 
principle that ‘another world is possible’,13 but as yet this has not been specifically 
applied to a critique of media power. 
 
All this is admittedly schematic. Power does not flow in straight lines, nor are 
institutions the only source of power or its contestation. Actual contestations of power 
are usually the result of multiple forces. Such is the systemic complexity of media 
markets, for example, that they may sometimes, against corporate interests, generate 
alternative symbolic resources; similarly with state-subsidised media systems. In such 
cases, the only partly institutionalised force of civil society is crucial (Keane, 1998). 
 
Rather than pursue further this institutional complexity, maybe we should ask a 
different question: what is the potential contribution to long-term shifts in media 
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power from changes in what individuals do with media? There are a number of 
dimensions along which we could look: 
 
1. new ways of consuming media, which explicitly contest the social legitimacy 
of media power; 
2. new infrastructures of production, which change who can produce media and 
in what circumstances; 
3. new infrastructures of distribution which change the scale and terms on which 
symbolic production in one place can reach other places. 
 
The first dimension (consumption) has been a striking absence from most accounts of 
alternative media until now (Downing, 2002), and almost as little is known about how 
people select from, or adjust for, the inadequacies of mainstream media.14 Media 
consumption takes place largely in private, in what Sartre called ‘serial absence’,15 so 
that the cumulative impact of individuals’ private media consumption for example is 
obscure. At what point, for example, will some people’s habit of getting news from a 
changing variety of localised web-sources (including semi-public networks and 
private testimonies) turn into scepticism about the truth-claims of large-scale news 
institutions? How significant, indeed, are these new habits, compared to Web use for 
more convenient access to newspaper and television news? Clearly we can currently 
only speculate on such questions, although it is worth insisting that individual practice 
cannot change independently of social assumptions about the trustworthiness of media 
and other institutions, which are linked to shifts in the infrastructures of knowledge 
production and distribution.16  
 
This leads to the second and third dimensions, dimensions which are less familiar, 
since infrastructural changes are always difficult to isolate. The Internet has 
dramatically increased our interest in media infrastructure: first, because the Internet 
has increased the ease with which any digitalised material can be distributed across 
national, organisational and social boundaries; second, because new forms of open-
source software are increasing the speed with which innovations in digital production 
can spread, at least among those with high computer literacy. The long-term impacts 
of these changes on media consumption, and people’s beliefs about the media’s social 
status remain uncertain, but it is, I suggest, to new hybrid forms of media producer-
consumer that we should look for change, since they challenge precisely the 
entrenched division of labour (producer of stories versus consumer of stories) that is 
the essence of media power.  
 
I am thinking, for example, of the Indymedia movement, with its local websites that 
always combine specialised production with an open invitation for non-specialists to 
contribute largely unedited news material; as a result, every Indymedia consumer is 
encouraged also to be a producer, which implies the opposite as well (that every 
Indymedia producer has to become a consumer of the media productions not just of 
fellow specialists, but also of the wider audience). Thus an explicit aim of the original 
Indymedia website at Seattle is ‘to empower individuals to become independent and 
civic journalists by providing a direct, unmoderated form for presenting media . . . to 
the public via the Internet’ (Seattle Indymedia, 2002: 2). Once again, however, these 
emergent forms of consumption-production are not isolated individual choices. They 
occur in certain places, under certain material conditions which perhaps are, and will 
always be, exceptional (small community networks linked to certain forms of 
 7
subsidy?). We need to know much more about the possibilities for sustaining such 
hybrid practices within, or at least alongside, increasingly ‘flexible’ labour markets.17 
And, even if such hybrid practices prove sustainable for some, who else outside 
Indymedia’s limited circle of consumer/producers knows about, and can be influenced 
by, these new practices? I return to such questions shortly. 
 
Here the contestation of media power merges into the wider question of how social 
change is possible, and from where – very much an open question, as older forms of 
citizenship, community and politics undergo intense scrutiny.18 As we saw earlier, 
such overlaps are to be expected, but this is not the end of the story. If, as Paul Clarke 
argues (1996: 125), ‘to be a deep citizen is to determine for oneself that an action is 
political’, then perhaps the concept of media is in equal need of redefinition: that is, 
who do we expect to participate in the process of mediation and from where? Which 
is a good point for the generalities of theory to make way for more specific and 
personal narratives.  
 
Two Narratives of Change 
 
I want to pursue two different visions of change: the first from Matthew Arnison, one 
of the Australian developers of the open-source software on which the Indymedia 
websites across the world rely; the second from Paul Eedle, the UK founder of the 
website www.megastories.com which (under the title ‘Out There News’) gathered 
from the mid 1990s until early 2002 a huge range of individual stories about global 
news events from across the world, as well as valuable information archives on major 
news stories.19 The first was developed within local community politics in Sydney 
and the global open-source software movement (Himanen, 2001), the second close to 
the mainstream news market (Eedle is a former Reuters journalist). I hope to show, 
however, that these differences are outweighed by the complementarity of those 
understandings ways to the underlying dynamics of media power. 
 
‘Open Publishing’ and its Limitations 
 
Let’s begin with Arnison’s definition of ‘open publishing’ that he believes the Web 
enables and the Indymedia movement embodies: 
 
Open publishing means that the process of creating news is transparent to the 
readers. They can contribute a story and see it instantly appear in the pool of 
stories publicly available. Those stories are filtered as little as possible to help the 
readers find the stories they want. Readers can see editorial decisions being made 
by others. They can see how to get involved and help make editorial decisions. If 
they can think of a better way for the software to help shape editorial decisions, 
they can copy the software because it is free and change it and start their own site. 
If they want to redistribute the news, they can, preferably on an open publishing 
site. (Arnison, 2002b: 1) 
 
Arnison suggests that a real shift in media power must involve all dimensions of the 
media process (production, distribution, consumption, and the infrastructure that links 
them). Thus new ways of consuming information (from visibly edited online texts) 
may encourage people to participate in production, participation whose technical 
possibility depends on the formats made available through new, easily transferable 
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open-source software, creating an open field of media production/ consumption 
replicable on further linked sites. 
 
This concept of open publishing is not abstract, but is linked to Arnison’s vision of a 
new form of community media.20 Arnison is a key producer of the Active Sydney 
website21 (part of an Australian network of community information sites, which 
encourage individual postings). Active Sydney’s aim is ‘to tailor electronic 
communication to the needs of the community, rather than corporate or government 
interests’ (Active Sydney, 2002). In his document on Open Publishing (Arnison 
2002b), Arnison takes this notion of community media even further: 
 
The most successful internet sites rely on the creativity of their users, not on 
professional producers as was the tradition with earlier electronic media . . . On the 
old one-way systems, community media was the exception. On the net, community 
media is very much part of the mainstream. (Arnison, 2002b: 6). 
 
While the concept of ‘community’ remains a difficult one, it at least puts on the table 
issues of public use and public purpose. So too the Seattle IMC’s Editorial Group 
states as one of its aims ‘to maintain the [Indymedia] newswire and website as a 
community space’ (Seattle IMC, 2002: 1).22  
 
Some things remain uncertain about Arnison’s (and equally Indymedia’s) vision of 
participatory media. How broad is the social cross-section from which their producer/ 
audiences23 are drawn? If ‘open publishing is overwhelmingly done by volunteers’ 
(Arnison, 2002b: 3), not paid workers, and, given the principle of ‘copyleft’ which 
Arnison adopts from the founder of the open-source movement, Richard Stallman (all 
material freely copiable, provided that when copied the original source is always 
transparent to the reader), the upshot is that Indymedia production is necessarily done 
in people’s spare time. This restricts participation to those whose resources allow 
them to give up ‘free’ time in this way: people who already have to do two or three 
jobs to make ends meet are automatically excluded. There also other bases of 
exclusion, the most obvious, apart from literacy, being the computer skills necessary 
to convert material into the format required for use on Indymedia and similar sites.  
 
Equally, we can ask about the non-producing audience for this new, more open media 
form. Indymedia UK’s web statement is striking for its insistence that what it offers is 
not journalistic ‘objectivity’: ‘Indymedia UK clearly states its subjectivity’ 
(Indymedia UK, 2002).24 The directness is refreshing, but it leaves unclear how the 
consumer of Indymedia UK’s news is understood. Is a postmodern reader assumed 
who happily accepts that all truth is ‘relative’, or a reader committed to the rightness 
of a certain view of the world and its inequities? If the former, then the Indymedia 
news philosophy is less interesting than it seems, but if the latter, what degree of 
accountability to its audience does it accept?  
 
The answer, I suggest, lies in a different vision of how news production and 
consumption are interrelated, a vision which, once again, Matthew Arnison articulates 
well through his notion of ‘open editing’ (Arnison 2002a): instead of editing 
happening behind the scenes, ‘open editing’ involves any reader being able to post an 
edited version of a text back onto the site where it was published, but with the editing 
steps and their author displayed in another file directly accessible on the site. This is 
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an engaging idea, although an important question remains about the actual social 
conditions under which sufficient such reader/producers are available. 
 
Rethinking the Mainstream News Audience 
 
Another, in its way equally radical, vision of change to media power comes from Paul 
Eedle, the founder of the news site www.megastories.com  which under the title ‘Out 
There News’ featured for some years minimally edited first-person stories about 
world events, either sent in by readers of the site or encouraged by its team of usually 
part-time ‘stringers’ around the world. The site attracted mainstream media attention 
for its personal stories after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, collected not 
just from the US but from Pakistan, Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East.  
 
The importance given to personal narratives and reader discussion was part of the 
site’s original philosophy. As Paul Eedle explained when I interviewed him in his 
London home:  
 
John West and I started Out There News because we thought that the on-line 
medium had a lot of potential that wasn’t being exploited by mainstream 
organisations. We saw the potential, particularly in two areas.  One was to provide 
in-depth news, news that you could explore context and background to current 
events. . . . we saw the potential with on-line to separate breaking news and the 
context and background . . .  the idea was to produce explorable depth, using the 
multimedia nature of the medium, using audio, using images, using graphics and 
using different sorts of writing . . . The second direction, where we thought the 
medium was not being used by the mainstream was contributed journalism, to use 
the readers of the website as the sources. And there I think the mainstream still is 
being very conservative. We felt that on-line changed the relationship between 
journalists and the audience. It’s not just a two-way relationship where readers can 
comment on what you put out but it . . . puts journalists or puts the audience on the 
same level as the journalist. And the journalist has to, has to earn the right to 
communicate by having something to say.  And equally the audience may well 
know as much about the subject as the journalist and . . . if you’re prepared to put 
that at the centre of the site, then I think you can produce radically new views of 
the world. (Interview with author, 11 July 2002) 
 
The aim was to expand the potential of mainstream news production, not to offer a 
direct alternative. This affected the audience targeted (‘we never really wanted to 
address a niche alternative audience . . . I have no interest in preaching to the 
converted’) and readers’ expected routes to the site (most of the site’s finance came 
from contracts under which the site provided content via links to the web portal AOL 
and the NTL cable interface).  
 
Out There News’ editorial policy was quite different from Indymedia’s avoidance of 
editorial intervention, combining normal principles of journalistic ‘objectivity’ (for 
example, in its information archives for particular ‘megastories’, and its concern that a 
totally open policy would risk the site ‘becoming overwhelmed with rubbish’) with a 
belief that editorial intervention should, nonetheless, be kept to a minimum. Editorial 
judgement was exercised in what major themes were highlighted for contributions and 
sometimes in facilitating particular narrators (for example, Abdul Malouk, a Pashtun 
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living in a refugee camp on the Pakistan/ Afghanistan border, who spoke no English 
and obviously had no computer access); but much of the material obtained was 
relayed largely unedited (interviews, diaries, and messages-boards linked to diary 
entries). We should not be blinded by Out There News’ mainstream context so as to 
ignore the radicalness of this editorial philosophy. In effect, this was an experiment 
with journalistic control. Unlike in other largely dishonest attempts at media 
‘democratisation’ (such as Big Brother), the Out There News diarists were given 
regular chances to update their diaries on their own terms and to respond at leisure to 
comments from readers. The journalist became, for some purposes, not reporter, but 
moderator, but without the ritualistic boundary-setting role common, for example, in 
television talk-shows (cf Couldry, 2002, chapter 7).  
 
Underlying this shift in the journalist’s role was a distinctive assessment of the 
‘ordinary’ news consumer: 
 
It was built on some assumptions about how people consume information on-line. . 
. . we believed that people . . . came to the web in two modes. One was browsing 
mode to see what’s there, you know, show me the latest.  And the other was 
actively seeking information, a mode of actually seeking information. . . . That’s 
why we set up Mega-Stories because we thought that people would actively seek 
information and that people would set their own agenda. 
 
This assumed ‘active reader’ was understood by Eedle also as a potential producer: 
 
I mean everybody quickly cottoned on to having message boards and doing live 
chat and so on. . . .  although we were early doing that, we were also perhaps 
different in the importance we attached to it in saying that this wasn’t kind of 
comment on the site, this was the site in some cases. (added emphasis) 
 
If Arnison’s ‘open publishing’ philosophy imagined a producer-consumer building 
production resources outside mainstream media institutions, Eedle imagined a 
consumer-producer emerging from the mainstream news audience. Out There News 
too, however, faced significant constraints. First, as already mentioned, its funding 
derived from the early period of AOL’s and NTL’s development when each had a 
clear interest in developing links to a range of content sources; funding was not 
renewed, leading to the eventual closure of new writing on the site in early 2002. 
Second, there was the need to exercise a  degree of editorial control (given the 
funding arrangements, there was no option). This control was not transparent, so that 
Out There News would not qualify as ‘open publishing’ in Arnison’s (2002b) 
definition, nor would it have wanted to. Nonetheless, Eedle’s long-term vision for a 
future multimedia information and news platform is democratic in its ambitions:  
 
. . . we would have a whole range of different levels of contributor from 
professional filmmakers with a broadcast background for whom this would be an 
interesting way to finance projects that wouldn’t otherwise see air, down to 
activists and students and other people who are gaining multimedia literacy, video 
literacy, as equipment gets cheaper and skills spread. And of course there’d still be 
room for people without any media skills at all to contribute by us sending a crew 
to work with somebody to tell a story through their eyes.  
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However he is less sanguine than Arnison about the underlying skill constraints on 
opening up production: 
 
I don’t think that we should underestimate the level of skill that’s needed to 
produce watchable you know, compelling television. . . . it is a wider range of 
skills and in fact, normally really a team effort compared to writing a readable 
textural contribution.   
 
Even so, Eedle thought, the balance of power might shift: ‘there are going to be an 
awful lot more people who can tell a story in video in the future than would ever get 
an airing on conventional television channels’.  
 
While more limited and cautious than Arnison, Eedle’s vision of an enlarged media 
mainstream is valuable for its clear grasp of the effective separation of most media 
consumption from activist practice: 
 
I think that the value of a platform like Out There News is to encourage people 
who wouldn’t otherwise contribute to contribute. And an activist will always find a 
way but it’s encouraging, stimulating people who wouldn’t imagine that their voice 
was worth hearing. Encouraging them to contribute is I think . . . an interesting 
ambition. (added emphasis) 
 
Behind this lies Eedle’s sense that the power of both media and political institutions is 
changing through the dispersal of information sources: 
 
Media become less relevant because people now have multiple information sources 
which are not controlled by gatekeepers. Anybody can communicate anything and 
that means that people can find out whatever they need to find out for their 
particular issue . . . So there is a very large irrevocable shift of power away from 
hierarchical bureaucracies whose hey-day was in a 19th century and early 20th 
century industrial state, a huge spread of power away from bureaucracies to 
individuals which . . . has effects every aspect of public life and politicians will 
need to catch up with it. 
 
Whether right or wrong, this is hardly a trivial vision of the links between media 
power and social change.   
 
In place of a conclusion 
 
We have followed in some detail two different visions of how the landscape of media 
power may be changing, the first developed on the margins of institutional media 
production, the second from near its centre, but each illuminating the axes of change 
within the media sphere (production, distribution, consumption) and the sphere of ‘the 
political’.25 We arrive back at the question of framing, which was central to the 
earlier, more theoretical section of this chapter. As we look towards future challenges 
to the structures of media power, the question of framing can be put more specifically: 
what are the social purposes for which we use and make media, and are they 
changing? Instead of providing a neat resolution to that question, I want, finally, to 
translate it into further unanswered questions about long-term changes in media’s 
place in social and political life.  
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Recall another period when changes in communication technology contributed to 
fundamental long-term shifts in the organisation of social and political life: the spread 
of the printed book in the early modern era in Western Europe. Robert Wuthnow in 
his book Communities of Discourse (Wuthnow, 1987) analyses the factors that 
contributed to major ideological shifts such as the Reformation and the birth of 
modern democratic politics, and sees the book and the new information networks it 
made possible as essential. What is so useful about Wuthnow’s analysis is that it 
encompasses the social contexts which came into being around the book: the new or 
altered networks (church, school, political party) where the technology of the book 
was central, the many paths that allowed those networks to connect with other spaces, 
such as formal political arenas, the new circuits for the distribution of ideas that 
emerged in printed form (journal, newspaper), and above all the social hierarchies that 
arose in the course of those changes: the birth of the literary public sphere and the 
social exclusions on which it was based (the coffee-house versus the market-square). 
Without addressing new media (he was writing in 1987), Wuthnow helps us imagine 
the social architecture through which communication technologies become socially 
established and the way new power relations inhere within them.  
 
Few would doubt the potential significance of computer-based communication 
interfaces for the future of media power, but the Internet’s first prophets were blind to 
questions such as Wuthnow’s. In the spirit of Wuthnow, we can ask some new 
questions. Regardless of current hopes to the contrary, will the Internet come to be 
seen primarily as a quasi-private space (just as casual conversations on the street are 
almost never thought of as publicly significant – they occur in a private sub-zone of 
public space), or will the Internet indeed become a genuine supplement to or 
replacement for existing mediated public space? What hierarchies will develop 
between the Internet and other public or private spaces, or between certain Internet 
spaces and others? Will those hierarchies prove as socially entrenched as those around 
the 20th century’s main electronic media? If so, will the result be to undermine, or 
further entrench, media power?  
 
There is one key paradox that may prove crucial in all this; a paradox lived out by 
most of us daily, although less often articulated. This is the shift over 150 years from 
a world with insufficient information flows (the ‘crisis of control’ in the mid 19th 
century that James Beniger (1986) saw as the driving force behind not only modern 
communications, but also the birth of ‘scientific’ management and accounting) to a 
world where there is now too much information (many times over), in effect a reverse 
‘crisis of control’, where the highest premium applies not to information production 
but to information selection. Media are part of that information excess but, in so far as 
media are leisure, not compulsory, activities, are especially vulnerable to drastic shifts 
in how people select from the information and image environment.26 Perhaps we are 
entering an era when many of us will want to look more closely at where and to what 
end we obtain news about the world.  
 
A virtue of producers outside mainstream media channels – those concerned, at least 
in part, with contesting media power itself - is that they refuse to take for granted the 
question of what social ends media serve, and those ends’ connection with that hard-
pressed ideal we call ‘democracy’. If so, there is reason to believe that their voices 
will be heard more clearly in this century’s expanding media universe than in the last. 
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19
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20
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